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Probate: Perfunctory Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem
Will Not Bind a Minor
Louise Ladehoff died in 1950, survived by her husband and two minor
sons, Donie and his elder brother, Wayne. Six years later, the husband
found a holographic will purportedly made by Louise in 1949,1 and of-
fered it for probate." Donie was not given personal service in connection
with the application for probate, because the Texas Probate Code only re-
quires notice by posting. Wayne, then 22, filed a contest to the application,
but subsequently entered into a settlement with his father. The probate
court, without a hearing on the merits, dismissed Wayne's contest with
prejudice.' In July 1957, the probate court rendered judgment admitting
Louise's will. Because Donie was still a minor, a guardian ad litem was
appointed to represent his interest prior to the admission of the will.' The
guardian appeared and heard all of the evidence, but did not take an ac-
tive part in the proceedings.
In February 1966, within two years after reaching majority,' Donie
instituted an action under sections 31 and 93' of the Probate Code to
contest and set aside the original probate proceeding. He alleged that the
will was a forgery. The probate court denied the contest and Donie ap-
pealed to the district court. His father moved for a summary judgment,
contending that the original probate judgment was res judicata. Donie,
however, argued that his right to attack the will had been preserved under
sections 93' and 31.16 The district court rendered summary judgment
against Donie and the court of appeals affirmed." Held, reversed: A minor
'The will was a two-sentence document leaving each son $500 and "everything else" to the
husband.
'This was done in accordance with the provisions of the Texas Probate Code. TEX. PROE. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-435 (1956).
'id. § 128(a).
' The brother appeared in court and announced that his claim had been settled.
5A guardian ad litem was appointed by the probate judge because he deemed it proper since
there was a bequest to a minor. Ladehoff v. Ladehoff, 436 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. 1968).
sMinors have two years after reaching majority in which to institute an action. TEx. PROB.
CODE ANN. §§ 30, 31, 93 (1956).
'This section provides that:
Any person interested may, by a bill of review filed in the court in which the probate
proceedings were had, have any decision, order or judgment rendered by the court,
or by the judge thereof, revised and corrected on showing error therein; . . . no bill
of review shall be filed after two years have elapsed from the date of such decision,
order, or judgment. Persons non compos mentis and ninors shall have two years after
the removal of their respective disabilities within which to apply for a bill of review.
TEX. PROD. CODE ANN. § 31 (1956) (emphasis added).
This section provides that:
After a will has been admitted to probate, any interested person may institute suit in
the proper court to contest the validity thereof, within two years after such will
shall have been admitted to probate and not afterward, . . . [p]rovided, however, that
persons non compos mentis and sinors shall have two years after the removal of their
respective disabilities within which to institute such a contest.
TEX. PsoB. CODE ANN. § 93 (1956) (emphasis added).
'TEx. PROD. CODE ANN. 5 93 (1956).
1"TEx. PRODB. CODE ANN. 5 31 (1956); see note 7 supra.
" The appeals court held that appellant was a party to the original probate proceeding where
he was represented by a duly appointed guardian ad litem, and that in the absence of fraud or
collusion the original judgment was final and conclusive of all issues sought to be raised. Ladehoff
v. Ladehoff, 423 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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NOTES
who was not personally served in a prior probate proceeding, and who was
represented by a guardian ad litem whose appointment was not required,
is not barred from instituting a direct attack under section 93 of the Texas
Probate Code on the order of the probate court. Ladehoff v. Ladehoff,
436 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1968).
I. TEXAS PROBATE PROVISIONS FOR MINORS
Tolling the Statute of Limitations. The Texas Probate Code protects
minors' rights to contest the validity of wills in which they have an in-
terest, by tolling the statute of limitations until they reach majority.'"
Three sections of the Probate Code contain such a provision. The first is
section 30" which provides for a writ of certiorari. This is an equitable
right given at the discretion of the court. Sections 31 and 93 are of prin-
cipal importance in providing for attack of the judgment in the principal
court as a matter of right.
Section 31, authorizing a bill of review, provides for the revision or
correction of a will after it has been admitted to probate." Originally it
was placed in the part of the Code entitled Guardian and Ward, but in
later revisions was included in the section on appeals and has been con-
strued as a general review provision.' Under this section the suit may be
filed in the court in which the original proceedings were had.
Section 93 provides a means for contesting a will that has been admitted
to probate. However, the section does not state specifically where the will
contest should be initiated, but directs merely that it be in the "proper
court."' 6 In 1883," the Texas supreme court dealt with the Texas statute"
which is the predecessor of section 93 of the Probate Code. The court
found that the legislature intended county courts to have original juris-
diction in probate matters and that direct attacks should be initiated in
the same court.' The same intent continued in the adoption of section 93,
the only change being the shortening of the statute of limitations from
four to two years. Accordingly, there seems to be little question that a
direct attack is permitted in the court of original jurisdiction until the
statute of limitations has run. In many cases sections 31 and 93 may pro-
vide the same remedy, because the facts necessary for a total revision of a
will can be the same as those for a will contest."
The effect of these statutory provisions, combined with the tolling of
the statute of limitations, is that the right of a minor to contest or revise
a will is preserved until he has reached majority and is able to make deci-
sions for himself. Therefore, in Texas, a probate judgment remains sub-
' See note 6 supra.
3 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 30 (1956).
'"Schoenhals v. Schoenhals, 366 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), error ref. n.r.e.
"5 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 349 (1963).
16 See note 8 supra.
'"Franks v. Chapman, 60 Tex. 46 (1883), and 61 Tex. 576 (1884).
"
9 TEX. CiV. STAT. art. 3212 (1879).
"' The Franks court stated that the legislature intended to provide a method for making a direct
attack upon a probate judgment in addition to appellate attacks.
0 Roberts, Procedural Content of Will Contests, 14 BAYLOR L. REV. 316, 327 (1962).
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ject to direct attack in the original court as long as there are minors who
may have rights in the estate."' Because the Code is silent as to the effect
of representation of minors during original probate proceedings, problems
occur when a minor is thought to have been fully represented. 2
The Guardian Ad Litem. There are several provisions in the Probate Code
for the appointment of a guardian of the person of a minor or of his
estate, 2 but only in section 376"4 does the Code specifically require appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem. This section, however, applies only to pro-
ceedings involved with actual distribution of an estate, not to those con-
cerned with the admission of a will to probate. In the latter category of
proceedings, a court is not required to appoint a guardian ad litein, al-
though it will often do so as a matter of convenience. In such a situation,
the guardian is generally an inactive observer of the proceedings, "repre-
senting" the minor only in a formal sense.2" However, if the minor is
either a plaintiff or defendant in a civil suit, and the persons who would
normally represent him have interests adverse to his, appointment of a
guardian ad litem is required under rule 173 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. Accordingly, should a minor enter a will contest, he would
become a plaintiff, and rule 173 probably would apply.
It has not been clear whether appointment of a guardian ad litem in a
probate proceeding should deprive a minor of his right to attack the pro-
bate judgment within two years after reaching his majority. It might be
argued that representation of the minor in probate proceedings eliminates
the need for permitting an attack after the minor reaches majority. This
argument presumes that the guardian has been properly appointed. Gener-
ally, it is agreed that a guardian is properly appointed only after personal
service of the minor. 8 The Probate Code requires only posted notice" for an
application for admission of a will, so a guardian appointed at the time of
the hearing, after notice has been by posting only, would not have been
21 This has not placed a heavy burden on the community since Ladehoff v. Ladehoff, 436 S.W.2d
334 (Tex. 1968), is the first recorded case since the adoption of the revised Probate Code in 1955.
22 This is the problem which is at issue in Ladehoff.
2 Some of them are: TEx. PROB. CoDE ANN. §§ 108-127, 184, 185, 189, 228, 229 (1956).
24This section provides that: "Where there are minors, or persons of unsound mind, having no
guardian in this tate, who are entitled to a portion of an estate, or whose guardians also have an
interest in the estate, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent such minors .
TEX. PROB. CooE ANN. § 376 (1956) (emphasis added).
2 
Tx. PROB. CoDE ANN. §§ 373-87 (1956).
" This was apparently the case in the original probate proceeding admitting Louise Ladehoff's
will. Ladehoff v. Ladehoff, 423 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
27Texas provides for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in the Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The rule is as follows:
When a minor . . . is a party to a suit either as plaintiff, defendant or intervenor
and is represented by a next friend or a guardian who appears to the court to have
an interest adverse to such minor .... the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
for such person and shall allow him a reasonable fee for his services to be taxed as a
part of the costs.
T. x. R. Civ. P. 173 (emphasis added).
2'A guardian is properly appointed after the court has obtained jurisdiction over the minor
through personal service. Wheeler v. Ahrenbeak, 54 Tex. 535 (1880); 43 C.J.S. Infants § 110(b)
(1945).
2 Tnx. PROB. CODE ANN. S 128(a) (1956).
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properly appointed and would not bind the minor." However, the lan-
guage of sections 30, 31 and 93 which tolls the statute of limitations for
minors, contains no provisional phrases and therefore even the representa-
tion by a properly appointed guardian ad litem would not seem to deprive
the minor of his statutory right to attack a probate judgment on reaching
majority.
II. LADEHOFF v. LADEHOFF
In Ladehoff the Texas supreme court upheld the statutory right of a
minor to contest a will by a direct attack after he has reached majority.
Although this case was brought under both sections 93 and 31 of the
Texas Probate Code, the court treated the suit solely as a will contest
under section 93. The initial question with which the court dealt was
whether the appointment of a guardian ad litern in the probate proceed-
ing deprived the minor, Donie, of his statutory right to institute a direct
attack under that section." The court seemed to find significant the fact
that the guardian did not join in the will contest instituted by Donie's
brother, but did not explain its relevance. It simply declared that Donie's
right to a direct attack of the probate order was not conditioned upon the
absence of a guardian ad litem. Donie's father relied upon section 3762
of the Texas Probate Code, and rule 173" of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure as authority for the appointment of the guardian ad litem. He
contended that if appointment of the guardian had been required under
either of these provisions, Donie was barred from instituting an attack
under section 93. The court did not find it necessary to decide whether
the mandatory appointment of a guardian could preclude a later action
under section 93, because it found neither section 376, nor rule 173, ap-
plicable to the original probate proceeding.
Another question was presented to the court which it found unnecessary,
and indeed expressly declined, to decide.' In both section 376 and rule 173,
personal service of the minor is required. Had the court found either of
these provisions to have been applicable to the original probate proceeding,
it might have commented on the effect of personal service, which they
require. The court, by declining to decide the effect of either the required
appointment of a guardian, or personal service of a minor, gives no sug-
gestion as to the relative importance of either of these factors. Although
personal service is necessary in a situation where a guardian must be ap-
pointed, it is clear that there may be personal service in situations not re-
0""Since the service of process on an infant is a condition precedent to the appointment of
a guardian ad litem, as discussed in § 110, as a general rule a failure to serve an infant is not
cured by the appointment of a guardian ad litem who appears or answers for him." 43 C.J.S.
Infants § 115(b)(2)(a) (1945).
"'The court cited Franks v. Chapman, 61 Tex. 576, 582 (1884) as authority for the right
of direct attack.
asTEx. PROB. COD ANN. § 376 (1956); see note 24 supra.
" TEx. R. Civ. P. 173; see note 27 supra.
" The court said: "[w]e reserve judgment with respect to the effect of such an appointment
following personal service when required or authorized by a number of provisions of the Probate
Code." 436 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. 1968).
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quiring the appointment of a guardian. Indeed, there are sections of the
Texas Probate Code which require personal service, but not the appoint-
ment of a guardian.a" The court could have held that the actions of a
properly appointed guardian, after personal service of the minor, would
be binding, although the appointment was not specifically authorized by
statute. In Ladehoff the court stressed that Donie was neither named nor
personally served as a party in the original probate action. Finding that
this was the first direct attack by Donie and that the statute of limitations
had not run, the court held that the original probate judgment was void-
able and still subject to attack.
III. CONCLUSION
The Texas supreme court chose to construe strictly section 93. Ac-
cordingly, a probate judgment remains open to attack for the statutory
period despite the appointment of a guardian ad litem. This section has
been part of Texas probate procedure for almost 100 years and has sur-
vived numerous revisions of the Probate Code."6 The possible instability
of title to property, which this decision seems to permit, is precluded by
court decisions holding that innocent third parties can rely on a final
judgment even though it is later successfully attacked."
Unfortunately, the court did not take advantage of Ladehoff to rule on
several important issues implicit in the case. The first, although not direct-
ly presented to the court, is whether a probate proceeding is valid where
citation is only by posting. The decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Banks" has been thought to cast
doubt on the constitutionality of this aspect of Texas probate procedure.
The second issue is whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, whose
appointment is required by statute, will serve to deprive a minor of his
right to institute an attack on a prior probate order. Whether a given pro-
ceeding is subject to a provision requiring the appointment of a guardian
ad litem, is a matter over which a minor has no control. It might be
difficult to justify denial of a minor's section 93 rights merely because he
was represented by a guardian whose appointment is mandatory, but the
court seemed to admit such a possibility. Finally, the court failed to decide
whether a minor's right to attack a prior probate order could be destroyed
by personal service of the minor in the probate proceeding. This factor
sSee TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 33(c), 33(f), 50, 75, 86(a), 121(b), 130(c), 131(d),
136(e), 148, 172(a), 374, 385, 407 (1956).
aTEx. Cxv. STAT. art. 3212 (1879), TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 5534 (1911), now TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 93 (1956).
1
7 Jones v. Sun Oil Co., 137 Tex. 353, 153 S.W.2d 571 (1941); Steele v. Renn, 50 Tex. 467
(1879); Potka v. Potka, 205 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Civ. App.. 1947), error ref. n.r.e.; Gardner v.
Union Bank & Trust Co., 159 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), error ref. w.o.m.; Harden v.
Harden, 63 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
38 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950), in which the United States Supreme Court held that:
The statutory notice [by publication] to known beneficiaries is inadequate, not be-
cause in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because under the circumstances it is
not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other
means at hand . . . [and it] is incompatible with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a basis for adjudication depriving known persons whose whereabouts
are also known of substantial property rights.
[Vol. 23
